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Infrastructure as Gesture 
 
Gisa Weszkalnys 
 
A licensing round: March 2010. The first licensing round for petroleum exploration rights in the 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of São Tomé and Príncipe is launched at APPEX, “A truly global 
A&D [acquisitions and divestitures] conference” held in the Business Design Centre in Islington, 
London. The participants include exploration firms, individual country delegations, and service 
companies such as PGS, which has acquired STP’s seismic data and now supports the country’s 
presence at the conference. PGS seeks to capitalize on STP’s prospective oil. Products are being 
shown off on large-sized posters, maps and leaflets. Pens, sweets, coffee, biscuits, and other 
freebies are handed out. The PGS representatives assure me that the turnout is fulfilling their 
expectations. At least two companies have already shown interest in visiting PGS’s Surrey data 
room. The EEZ is virgin territory, they explain, and frontier areas attract interest. They expect bids 
to come in soon. Three per block would be good. On a screen in a darkened auditorium, STP’s 
Prime Minister Rafael Branco launches the licensing round. His failure to attain a visa prevented 
him from being there in person. The long-awaited licensing round was repeatedly delayed by 
conflicting political interests, mere foot dragging, or maybe by nothing at all. Time runs slowly in 
Africa, PGS representatives tell me. All that counts is that “today is an auspicious day for us”, as 
one of them proclaims. Ten years of seismic surveying and considerable investments—about 
$100,000 per day just to hire the research vessel—are finally coming to fruition. 
 
A citizens’ workshop: August 2015. About 140 Berliners gather in the Park Inn Hotel at 
Alexanderplatz, a public square in Berlin’s eastern centre. They have come to discuss with city 
planners, various experts, and each other Alexanderplatz’s future fate. A master plan for the 
square’s redevelopment, first conceived in the early 1990s but only partially implemented to date, is 
now considered in desperate need of revision. However, the parameters for the development will 
remain in place, explains Berlin Senate’s building director in her opening talk. Her words are 
carefully chosen: the aim is to update, not to redraw, the plan. In any case, as the architect who 
designed the plan emphasizes—repeating his view of twenty years ago—Alexanderplatz’s current 
socialist design is hardly worth keeping. When pressed, his prognosis is optimistic: “Two-thirds of 
the envisaged high-rise buildings will be built within the next five years”. “Capital has confidence 
in the location,” comments one of the participating experts, citing the developers’ preliminary €73 
million investment in infrastructures as evidence. Yet, he adds wryly, their confidence has not quite 
sufficed for high-rise buildings. What we are doing here, says one citizen, is to help dream the new 
Alexanderplatz into existence—complete with appealing shops and restaurants, adequate amenities, 
and affordable apartments—even as the master plan seems increasingly obsolete. 
 
In this chapter, I consider a specific modality of infrastructures in relation to the contradictory 
dynamics of contemporary capitalism.
1
 I call this modality “infrastructure as gesture”. The 
infrastructures I examine include a range of practices and devices, such as the licensing round for 
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São Tomé and Príncipe’s EEZ and the citizens’ workshop for Alexanderplatz. I argue that, as 
gestures, infrastructures are neither simply means to an end, that is, instruments in the realization of 
larger-scale projects. Nor are they ends, or project outcomes, in themselves. Instead, infrastructures 
as gestures suggest the existence of productive potential—often over extended periods of time and 
in situations where this potential may threaten to remain unrealized. They provide us with a clue to 
what sustains a notion of capitalism’s propulsive force, which we often take for granted, in the face 
of its characteristic contradictions (Harvey 1989). Infrastructures as gestures thus differ, in 
important ways, from infrastructural projects that have blatantly failed (Green, this volume), from 
those that have been called into question by their users (von Schnitzler 2013), and from 
infrastructures that ought not to work but have nonetheless persisted (Richardson 2016). By 
contrast, I argue that, in their gestural form, infrastructures contribute to the postponement of 
failure. Specifically, they prevent the projects of which they are part from being written off or 
abandoned.  
The gesture has been somewhat peripheral in anthropological theorizing—despite Geertz’s 
famous invocation of the wink and the twitch in his essay on thick description, and despite its 
prominent place in the writings of scholars such as Mauss, Elias, and Goffman.
2
 In developing the 
gesture’s analytical purchase beyond its conventional reference to a type of bodily movement, I 
draw not on anthropology, however, but on the work of Giorgio Agamben who has provided one of 
the most compelling discussions of the gesture as a philosophical concept. Agamben sought to 
formulate an ethics of encounter in which the “formless kind of life” embodied by the gesture is a 
critical element (ten Bos 2005: 27). Building on Varro and Aristotle, Agamben pointed to a subtle 
distinction between the gesture’s Latin root, gerere meaning to carry, manage, or conduct, and 
related action verbs, including facere (making, creating) and agere (acting, performing). In this 
view, “[t]he gesture is the exhibition of mediality: it is the process of making a means visible as 
such” (Agamben 2000: 58). The gesture, Agamben notes, is where “nothing is being produced or 
acted, but rather something is being endured and supported” (2000: 57). Similarly, though in a very 
different way from Agamben’s philosophical project, I argue that although the infrastructure as 
gesture usually fails to be productive, it is rarely “just” a gesture. That is, infrastructural gestures are 
not simply tokens, not vacuous, even as ambiguity remains inherent.  
I will develop the notion of the gesture’s indeterminate yet sustaining force by comparing 
two quite dissimilar cases. The first is the protracted quest for what petro-industry experts call “first 
oil” in São Tomé and Príncipe (STP), a micro-island state located in the oil-rich Gulf of Guinea. 
First oil refers to the initial oil pumped from a newly commercialized exploration well. It acts on 
forms of speculative knowledge and engages one or more capital, technology, and knowledge-
intensive investment projects that are the indispensable but inherently risky “motor[s] of capitalist 
wealth creation” (Røyrvik 2011:5). The second case is an equally drawn-out effort to complete one 
of Berlin’s most anxiously anticipated urban development projects, Alexanderplatz, a public square 
and transportation hub in the city’s eastern centre. 
When I started out research in STP in 2007, few people expected that, nearly a decade on, 
oil would still remain but a distant prospect. Contracts for petroleum extraction in STP’s offshore 
territory were signed in the late 1990s, followed by seismic research and exploratory drillings. 
However, the quest for first oil is always touch and go. Blockages and delay threaten at multiple 
points. Insufficient capital, labour, and expertise, political and institutional weaknesses, geological 
and ecological conditions, as well as burst commodities bubbles are among the factors that may halt 
anticipated resource booms (Dean 1987). First oil’s long lead-up time and decades of dormancy are 
experienced as a rupture of ordinary productive processes, as they have been in STP where no 
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significant discoveries have been made to date. The unfulfilled promise of STP’s resource assets 
has led me to examine my earlier research on Alexanderplatz with fresh eyes (Weszkalnys 2010). 
Not unlike oil in STP, the implementation of a master plan for Alexanderplatz, first proposed in 
1994, has been encumbered by material intransigence and the seemingly inscrutable economic logic 
of real estate markets.  
STP’s oil and Berlin’s Alexanderplatz each reveal a complex entanglement of the interests 
and desires of state actors, corporations, developers, investment funds, and citizens, which are 
supported in systematic but incomplete ways by infrastructural work. The technical, legal, and 
commercial infrastructures examined below sustain the distinctive temporality of dormancy and 
delay characteristic of both the Alexanderplatz development project and STP’s oil exploration. Here 
the attainment of concrete outcomes (buildings, first oil) gets readily overtaken by the circulation of 
facts about them. Productivity is put on hold for a variety of reasons, resulting in what, following 
Marx, I will refer to as a “pause”. In his analysis of the circuits of productive capital in volume 2 of 
Capital, Marx demonstrated the obstruction posed to capitalist value expansion and accumulation, 
for example, by labourers’ need for rest, by seeds sprouting in the soil, or by a shortage of necessary 
tools in the market. Productive capital is held “in readiness” but remains fallow, although this 
fallowness “is a requirement for the uninterrupted flow of the process of production” (Marx 2013: 
647). From one perspective, such pauses are the tacit drivers of an accelerating capitalist 
temporality: a problem to be avoided through managerial and technological change as well as credit 
systems in the interest of higher turnover rates and profits. However, from another perspective, 
pauses are partly generated by the multiple contradictions inherent in the dynamics of capitalist 
production (Harvey 1989:181-3). Here capital investment in suspense—sometimes for a given 
period a company might spend on the waiting list for a sought-after drilling barge or for the time it 
takes to complete bureaucratic procedure in a planning process, sometimes indefinitely. It is in the 
expansive moment of the pause that infrastructures acquire their gestural qualities. Despite their 
differences, the two cases discussed here show how epistemic instruments and technical devices—
such as contracts, exploration zones, and test wells in STP, and a legally binding masterplan, 
transport infrastructures, and even some incipient constructions at Alexanderplatz—have become 
gestures of potentiality without compelling a predetermined outcome.  
 
Infrastructures of First Oil 
 
In a chronicle of STP’s nascent petroleum economy, Luís Prazeres (2008), the former head of the 
country’s National Oil Agency, neatly sums up the infrastructural work that has been carried out to 
generate first oil there. Since the late 1990s, maritime boundaries have circumscribed the 
prospective hydrocarbon asset, expected to be located principally offshore; three licensing rounds 
allocated access to it;
3
 mechanisms for good governance and transparency have been implemented; 
and a series of agreements have defined the obligations of the country’s various industry partners. 
The National Oil Agency has been part of this effort as the body charged with managing the 
technical aspects of future hydrocarbon exploration (Weszkalnys 2011). More recently, the Agency 
organized the licensing round for the Santomean EEZ, discussed at the start of this chapter, which 
further buttressed a notion of Santomean oil prospects in the absence of their commercial 
realization.  
These legal, commercial, and technical infrastructures are constitutive of a socio-material 
arrangement of measurement, connection, and qualification characteristic of the global oil industry 
(Barry 2006). Importantly, with the continued deferral of STP’s first oil, these devices have 
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acquired additional salience. First, they supply the tangible scaffolding to what is largely a 
speculative endeavour (Tsing 2005: 63). Second, they provide an “informational enrichment”  
(Barry 2014: 141) of geological matter, making it amenable to the exploitative fantasies of states 
and their economic partners (Braun 2000). Third, in the face of a sluggish exploration process, they 
have become gestural. Like measurements of a foetal heartbeat, they furnish hope by signalling 
dormancy not death. Together, they prevent the pause into which STP’s first oil has entered from 
turning into a failure or loss. A closer examination of three such devices—the contract, the zone, 
and the well—will illustrate their sustaining or gestural force (cf. Agamben 2000).  
The start of what is locally referred to as STP’s “petroleum era” (era do petróleo) is often 
associated with the signing of a contract between the Santomean government and the Environment 
Remediation Holding Company (ERHC), a little-known U.S. oil company, in May 1997. The 
contract granted ERHC some extraordinary allowances in the exploitation of STP’s hydrocarbon 
resources. For a fee of US$5 million, it assigned the company 40 per cent of the revenues from 
future oil and preferential rights in future concessions. ERHC promised to raise the funds necessary 
to kick-start exploration activities. It would act as negotiator with any other company wishing to 
explore Santomean oil, and earn a 5 per cent fee from any payable bonuses. That is, rather than 
providing a course for action, the contract established a promissory value. Despite the company’s 
limited expertise and financial resources, ERHC staff convinced the Santomean officials of their 
ability to carry the project through and to raise US$100 million in seven months. These promises 
were supplemented by a number of gestural moves: A maritime boundary claim was filed, a joint 
venture oil company was formed between ERHC and the Santomean government, and in 1998 
another contract was signed with Mobil, later ExxonMobil, obliging the company to initiate seismic 
research in STP’s offshore territory where the key prospects were expected to be located (Seibert 
2006: 372).  
Over the next few years, ERHC and the Santomean government broke off, revised, and 
entered into new agreements. Accusations of bribery and corruption flew through the air. In 2001 
the company was acquired by Nigerian businessman, Emeka Offor, and subsequently battled 
bankruptcy and an investigation by the US Securities and Exchange Commission.
4
 While 
imperfectly quantified oil potential has begun produce some value for ERHC,
5
 for the Santomean 
state ERHC’s involvement is deemed responsible for a substantial loss of possible earnings, and is 
now criticized as a liability. However, such argument benefits from hindsight, I was reminded by 
Afonso Varela, the National Oil Agency’s former legal director. After all, he argued, ERHC 
effectively turned STP into a petroleum frontier at a time nobody paid attention. It indirectly 
generated 2,723 km of 2D seismic data of STP’s oil prospects, which were indispensable to attract 
additional investors (cf. Seibert 2006: 372). 
A second gesture in STP’s quest for first oil was the country’s filing of a maritime boundary 
claim and the establishment of an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) with the United Nations Law of 
the Sea Commission in New York City in 1998. Filing such claims, as a legislative act, has 
important consequences for the demarcation of new resource frontiers as well as the identification 
of owners and their legitimate partners. Dreams of sovereign substances and petroleum-based 
national self-sufficiency were soon challenged, however. Seismic surveys of STP’s offshore 
hydrocarbon potential, carried out by a subsidiary of the global petroleum-services provider 
Schlumberger (paid for by ExxonMobil), had located the most valuable prospects in areas bordering 
Nigerian waters (Seibert 2006: 372-3). Whilst Equatorial Guinea and Gabon readily accepted the 
suggested boundary of a Santomean EEZ based on a principle of equidistance, Nigeria proved 
recalcitrant. It questioned the principle’s appropriateness on the basis of its much larger coastline. 
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Three years of protracted negotiations ensued, leading to another important item of bilateral 
jurisdiction: a zone managed jointly but unevenly split between the two states, with Nigeria 
receiving sixty and STP forty per cent of any revenues that may be generated from it. 
The delineation of the joint development zone (JDZ), covering 34,450 km
2
, was a critical 
gesture, sustaining a notion of exploitable potential and opening up possibilities for anticipatory 
gain from substances not yet extracted. Now, exploration blocks could be allocated in auctions for 
exploration rights. However, especially the second of these licensing rounds, held in 2004, turned 
farcical the conventional wisdom that auctions are foolproof instruments for establishing a fair and 
real price. A report by STP’s Attorney General alleged clandestine decision-making involving 
Nigerian and Santomean government figures and their advisors, and called for the annulment of the 
licensing round.
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 Similarly, the authority managing the zone, the JDA, which has its headquarters in 
Abuja, has been seen as a fitting enactment of STP’s absent oil—an inflated bureaucratic apparatus 
with a budget of several million dollars per year, eating into STP’s limited petroleum revenues.7  
Finally, at the start of 2006, “encouraging early signs” from Obo-1, the first exploration well 
in Block 1 of the JDZ drilled by Chevron Texaco and the most “low-risk target” according to the 
company’s technical expertise, made ERHC share prices shoot up. Thousands of feet of steel had 
been lowered to perforate the icy-cold sea floor, a drilling riser bringing up the mud, people busy 
operating the equipment, measuring, analyzing, and ascertaining that the technology remained 
stably connected in this floating environment. Wells can increase companies’ stockmarket value by 
turning so-called possible and probable into proven reserves (cf. Mitchell et al. 2012: 30); but the 
geological conditions they reveal may also disrupt a project previously deemed technologically 
feasible and economically sound.  
Speaking to the press, Chevron’s expat representative, Tim Parsons, recommended caution 
before commercial viability was proven: “[I]t is too soon to speculate about a date for the first 
barrels.” Data so insufficiently analysed and confidential, it would be unethical for the company to 
even start guessing what they might reveal. For the moment, the reservoirs were deemed not to 
“justify economic development on their own.” Indeed, in 2010, Chevron withdrew from the JDZ for 
reasons that are likely to have included a careful balancing of geological prospects, technological 
possibilities, assessments of future oil markets, and the company’s need to satisfy both shareholder 
expectations and long-term crude supply for an integrated business. The disappointment was 
temporarily relieved by French multinational Total and its promise of a US$200 million investment 
to explore the JDZ’s Block 1. However, this company, too, pulled out less than two years later 
spelling, as some observers suggest, the end of Santomean oil hopes (Seibert 2013). 
Announcements of “no oil”, however, have been swiftly rephrased as “no oil yet”. Official 
pronouncements have remained optimistic. As STP’s Minister of Natural Resources claimed in an 
interview with a local newspaper in October 2013: “Companies have their politics, their profit 
margins and other [considerations], and they act in accordance with their expectations…[W]e have 
confirmed reserves [of hydrocarbons] in sufficient quantities to make [Block 1] viable.” Recent 
efforts to open up STP’s exclusive economic zone to commercial exploitation with seismic research 
and the licensing round discussed at the start of this chapter continue to act as gestures of the 
prospect of oil. Similarly, sporadic official announcements, assessments carried out by the IMF or 
the African Development Bank, new plans to deploy advanced exploration technology in the JDZ, 
and recent exploration contracts for blocks in the EEZ have not ceased to sow optimism.
8
 In lieu of 
productive value, they continue to hold out the promise of a profitable future. 
 
A Square Suspended 
 6 
 
I now wish to trace an instance of gesturing beyond the extractive sector. A case in point comes 
from my earlier research on an attenuated urban development project in post-unification Berlin 
(Weszkalnys 2010). Between 2001 and 2002, I carried out fieldwork in Berlin—a city caught, it 
seemed then, in an endless cycle of demolition and rebuilding following German unification a 
decade earlier. My research explored this dramatic transformation. I was particularly drawn to the 
controversy around Alexanderplatz, an emblematic square in the city’s eastern centre. If oil 
developments in STP have been associated with expectations of economic growth, prosperity, and 
greater autonomy from the grip of international donors and global governance agencies, the planned 
development of Alexanderplatz similarly supported the projection of a specific future imaginary. In 
this case, it was one of bringing the city back to an assumed normality after forty years of national 
division. This was to be accomplished through a massive spatial reordering of the square that, till 
then, had been characterized by its distinctive socialist design, in public-private partnership with a 
disparate group of national and international real-estate and investment firms. The controversy 
around Alexanderplatz crystallized some important issues about the painful process of building a 
future out of Berlin’s fragmented cityscape, and the conflicting ontologies of space and people, 
“East” and “West”, in the new Germany.  
A square suspended, ein Platz im Wartestand, was the nickname that Thomas, a member of 
a civic action group I worked with at the time, attributed to Alexanderplatz back in 2001.
9
 When I 
met Thomas again in 2015, after many years of being out of touch, the group of which he had once 
been a member to defend a “gentle” redevelopment of Alexanderplatz, had long dissolved. But, we 
agreed, the square still lay in anticipation of its future transformation, notwithstanding some visible 
changes: partially reorganized traffic routes, a new three-level underground car park, embellishing 
street furniture and pavestones, and even a new building or two sealing Alexanderplatz’s frayed 
seams. Yet this was still a large step removed from the radical change that had once been envisaged.  
I-B4a,
10
 as the master plan for Alexanderplatz is known by Berlin’s planning administrators 
is, in some sense, a hangover of the optimistic post-unification period when Berlin was projected to 
become a booming capital. First conceived in 1993, this plan came into force in April 2000. Its 
vision is one of near complete redevelopment: five high-rise buildings of up to 150 metres will be 
erected around the square, plus several more in the vicinity—comprising a volume of 417,700 
square metres of mixed-use functions, three times the volume available at the time the planning 
process was initiated. This vision has been slow to materialize. As a result I-B4a has displayed both 
fragility and obduracy (Hommels 2005; Richardson 2016).  
When I returned to Berlin in 2015, I attended the workshop discussed at the start of this 
chapter, following an earlier call by Berlin’s parliament to review the plan’s future fate. Years of 
non-implementation, as Thomas explained to me, had allowed time to reconsider, for example, the 
value of the GDR architecture around the square. Two of the former socialist buildings, Haus des 
Reisens and Haus des Berliner Verlages, have now attained “listed” status, setting unexpected 
constraints for the master plan’s realization. What’s more, an oversight by Berlin’s planning 
administration has meant that the two newly-erected buildings correspond only minimally with the 
high-rise vision. With an eye on short-term gain, developers have opted for a lighter, less costly 
construction technique than would be necessary for these buildings to be integrated into the more 
voluminous high-rises. Other, historical infrastructures have proven recalcitrant, too: a huge World 
War II bunker and underground train tunnels are obstacles to one of the planned building’s 
foundations.  
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As an item of local state planning and jurisdiction, I-B4a has proven inadequate in many 
ways. Yet few would call for a complete abandonment of the project. First, although the investors 
have consistently claimed economic conditions in Berlin to be unfavourable to development on the 
scale envisaged, there is a clear interest in hanging on to the significant square footage inscribed in 
the plan. And while Berlin’s planning administration might consider I-B4a a hindrance to the stated 
goal of urban enhancement, challenging the plan could have major political and legal repercussions. 
In the 2015 workshop, the Berlin Senate’s Building Director raised the possibility of a revision of 
the existing contracts with the investors. However, in conversations with administrators following 
the event, it became clear that such a revision was unlikely. Not only would it risk reopening a 
Pandora’s box of dispute and delay. It might also lead the investors to seek indemnification, not 
least for those €73 million already spent on infrastructures. Last, some of the citizens who 
participated in the workshop clearly did consider the event an opportunity to argue for a thorough 
overhaul of the existing plans. Comments scribbled on yellow, red, and blue cards and on writing 
boards distributed throughout the venue belied the apparently consensual atmosphere. They asked 
whether Berlin required any high-rise developments at all, demanded respect for the GDR 
architecture, and noted, quite simply, the master plan’s obsolescence. However, there was also 
much worry about what the future might bring. Many residents expressed a sense of devaluation, or 
at least a lack of correspondence between their own aspirations and the square’s ugly presence, 
largely associated with post-unification socio-economic changes. In this view, too, the desire for 
“improvement” was undiminished. 
In short, I-B4a has helped to sustain a notion of great economic, aesthetic, and ethical 
potential in the heart of Berlin’s eastern centre. Alongside the urban infrastructures that anticipate 
the future Alexanderplatz and the incipient building works, it is part of a repertory of gestural 
features pointing to a modern unified Berlin (cf. Kendon 1997: 119). Although I-B4a has 
functioned perhaps most effectively in structuring present relations between Berlin’s government, 
private investors, and citizens (cf. Baxstrom 2013), its anticipation of a developed Alexanderplatz 
has not been completely unsubstantiated. Planning, here, has been a matter of contingency and 
accommodation rather than a linear progression from intentions to results (Weszkalnys 2010; see 
also Abram and Weszkalnys 2013). The 2015 workshop could be seen as part of an effort to fix the 
plan “in increments”, befitting the size and complexity of this infrastructural system where 
“changes take time and negotiation, and adjustment with other aspects of the system are involved” 
(Star 1999: 382). I-B4a has thus been made to withstand the elasticity of time (Weszkalnys 2010: 
113) produced by the continued out-of-step temporalities of state planning, real estate and 
investment markets. 
 
Pausing and Gesturing 
 
In this chapter, I explored the relationship between processes of pausing and gesturing, that is, the 
role of infrastructures in sustaining a specific temporality characteristic of capitalist development.  
Here infrastructures play an important role, though not necessarily that originally intended. Façade, 
fake, or failure—anthropologists have highlighted a number of ways in which infrastructures gain 
visibility without fulfilling their expected purpose (Star 1999). So-called white elephants, for 
example, operate in what Larkin (2013: 335) dubs a “poetic” mode and embody a politics reliant on 
“arbitrary symbolic acts” (Mbembe and Roitman 1995: 337). White elephants don’t come to 
anything because, by definition, they are expressions of corrupt rule, underwritten by bribery and 
embezzlement (Appel 2012). In the contemporary economy of appearances, infrastructures may 
 8 
also provide fraudulent evidence propping up the illicit collusions between corporate and state 
agents and new circuits of financialization (Tsing 2005). Last, infrastructures that have proven 
blatantly harmful may be kept in place by political processes that aim to overrule unsustainable 
material realities (Richardson 2016). By contrast, the infrastructures discussed in this chapter are 
more indeterminate. Contracts, licensing rounds, economic zones, wells, plans, and workshops 
participate in dispersed sociomaterial arrangements designed to bring greater certainty to unwieldy, 
highly contingent projects but they inadvertently upend their stated goals. Instead of contributing to 
the realization of the potential that was envisaged, they become gestures of what might be. Even as 
their effects remain contested, they hold in suspense the possibility that, eventually, they will lead 
to something.  
At first glance, the two projects explored in this chapter might seem to have little in 
common: they take place on different continents, involving different sets of actors and technologies 
in the pursuit of different outcomes. However, they find themselves in a similar temporal moment, 
which I referred to as an extended pause. The time of the pause is not empty, not devoid of labour 
per se, even if the material transformations this labour generates can remain somewhat invisible. It 
is about ascertaining potentialities, and thus constituting, for example, geologic substances as a 
resource and plots of inner-city land as real estate. In the pause, the realization of economic 
potential is suspended but nevertheless maintained by a variety of infrastructural gestures, 
displaying a specific temporal ethics that attenuates or postpones failure. 
Potentiality, in the ethnographies that this chapter explored, presents itself both as “futures 
fold[ed] into presents” (Fortun 2008: 285) and as stymied, marked by blockages and setbacks 
(Røyrvik 2011). The speculative practices of oil corporations and investment firms inscribe value of 
a sort that remains unsubstantiated. Contracts are divested of their legal force by reference to 
economic pragmatism. Wells reveal not resources but a lack of viability. And supposedly real 
constructions are but proxies of the original. The outcome, however, is not the collapse of the 
projects in question but their continued suspension, in other words, a sustained pause. In lieu of 
productive value, the infrastructure as gesture thus holds out the promise of a profitable future. 
Potentiality is continually reaffirmed. These gestures invite us to critically re-examine 
contemporary capitalism’s persistent claims to boundless creativity. Instead, they highlight a 
multiplicity of speculative forms and temporal-material realignments that emerge when things slow 
down while everything else keeps moving. 
                                                        
1
 Portions of this chapter are reproduced by permission from my article “Geology, Potentiality, 
Speculation: On the Indeterminacy of ‘First Oil’”, Cultural Anthropology 30(4).  
2
 Linguistic anthropologists have noted the gesture’s important supportive role in communication, 
its ability to render speech more precise, to furnish additional meanings, or to substitute for it 
altogether (Kendon 1997). French anthropologist Marcel Jousse, for example, considered the 
gesture a predecessor to spoken language, underpinning our ability to imitate others and thus to be 
in the world. For Jousse, the gesture was part of what makes us uniquely human (Sinaert 1990). At 
the same time, enormous variety in gesture use has been observed across space and time as well as 
variety in the ontology of the gesture, for example, as an expression of “inner” or “unconscious” 
feelings or as an embodiment of ethics (Braddick 2009; Jackson 2013; Kendon 1997).  
3
 The first two licensing rounds in 2003 and 2004 pertained to the JDZ with Nigeria; a third round 
was held in 2010 for STP’s EEZ. 
4
 Any proceedings regarding ERHC were formally closed in April 2012. 
5
 Though overall a loss-making operation, ERHC sold some of its participating interests in 
Santomean oil blocks in 2006, making US$45,900,000. It also received US$51,800,000 from JDZ 
signature bonuses. 
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6
 Still, several PSCs regarding blocks 2, 3, and 4 were signed in 2005.  
7
 Signature bonuses from the JDZ licensing rounds have amounted to US$324,000,000 of which 
STP received approximately 40%. The JDA’s total budget 2004-2013 has been US$92,464,297, of 
which STP’s nominal contribution has been a little more than a third. However, US$22 million of 
this amount has been loaned to STP by Nigeria (see https://eiti.org/sao-tome-and-principe).  
8
 Exploração conjunta de petróleo com a Nigéria dentre de 18 meses, RFI Português, 4 April 2014; 
Galp, Kosmos awarded Sao Tome block, Rigzone, 27 October 2015.  
9
 Until the mid-twentieth century, the expression “im Wartestand” connoted a specific status of non-
active service for civil servants whose position had been dissolved or made redundant. 
10
 More precisely, there are several partial construction plans in the Alexanderplatz area (I-B4a, I-
B4a-3, I-B4ba and I-B4bb, I-B4ca and I-B4cb, I-B4d, I-43a and I-43b, I-70a and I-70b). I use I-B4a 
as shorthand, also because it is the one most frequently discussed, comprising the most central area 
of Alexanderplatz.  
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